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We use original 2005 household survey data from Fiji and Tonga to estimate the impact 
of migration and remittances on income distribution and measures of poverty, after 
controlling for selectivity in migration and endogeneity in the relationship between 
remittances and income. Measures of inequality and poverty based on actual,   
with-migration income and remittances are then compared with those based on a   
no-migration scenario. Counterfactual household incomes are estimated, taking account 
of what the migrant members would have earned had they not migrated. The results are 
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1 Introduction 
This paper addresses the impacts on poverty and income distribution of migration and 
remittances in two Pacific island countries, Fiji and Tonga. The analysis is based on 
household survey data collected by the authors as part of a World Bank study in Fiji and 
Tonga during 2005 (Brown et al. 2006). This focus is motivated by a concern among 
policymakers that migration opportunities could be biased towards wealthier and better-
educated households with easier access to international networks, with the resulting 
inflows of remittances being more likely to reinforce existing inequalities than reduce 
them. More specifically, the study estimates the impacts of remittances on income 
distribution (Gini coefficients) and on the incidence and depth of poverty (poverty 
headcount and poverty gap ratios). The paper does not address the causes, effects and 
more general socioeconomic dimensions of poverty and hardship in the South Pacific.1  
The primary challenge of this research is to assess the combined effects of out-
migration from these countries and the return flows of remittances, taking into account 
that remittances cannot be treated simply as an exogenous addition to household 
income. This paper recognizes that had the migrant household member not migrated, 
he/she would have contributed to household income, and, the number of domestically-
resident household members would be greater. The task before us then is to estimate 
what the household’s per capita income situation would have been in the absence of 
migration—the  counterfactual income level—and then to compare that with actual 
household per capita income with remittances included as part of total income. Previous 
studies of migration and remittances in the South Pacific have neglected this issue, 
choosing instead to treat remittances as an addition to what the household would have 
otherwise earned. In other words, rather than estimating a counterfactual without 
migration and remittances scenario, previous studies have simply compared actual 
income excluding remittances with income including remittances. This could result in 
an overestimation of the impact of remittances on both the level of household income 
(and poverty alleviation) and the distribution of income. In this paper we compare the 
results following both methodological approaches, allowing us to estimate the extent of 
over- or under-estimation of these impacts in previous work, including Brown et al. 
(2006).  
Section 2 discusses previous research on measures of income distribution and poverty in 
Fiji and Tonga, while a review of the existing literature on migration, income 
distribution and poverty in other countries is presented in section 3. The 2005 survey 
and data for Fiji and Tonga are discussed briefly in section 4. We use these data to 
estimate migrants’ counterfactual income which is then imputed into migrant 
households’ income to derive the counterfactual household income against which we 
then compare actual household income with migration and remittances (section 5). With 
these estimates we are able to make comparisons of income distribution and poverty 
with and without migration and remittances. The results of our findings are then 
compared with: (i) the results that would have been found had we treated remittances 
simply as an exogenous addition to household income; (ii) the estimates of poverty and 
income distribution from other studies of Fiji and Tonga, including those which 
                                                 
1   For recent analyses of poverty and hardship in the South Pacific more generally, see Abbott and 
Pollard (2004); Walsh (2002); AusAID (2006: ch. 3).   2
estimate the impacts of remittances; and, (iii) studies of the impact of remittances on 
income inequality and poverty in other countries. In section 6 conclusions are drawn. 
2  Previous research on Fiji and Tonga 
2.1 Migration  histories 
The choice of Fiji and Tonga as country studies for the World Bank study (Brown et al. 
2006) was motivated by their different migration histories and remittance behaviours. 
Tonga, with over 40 years of intensive remittances-motivated migration, receives much 
larger per capita remittance flows and is more comparable to Samoa. In the case of Fiji, 
international migration is a relatively more recent phenomenon, but there are also 
important differences in migration histories between the two main ethnic groups, Indo- 
and Indigenous-Fijians.  
Recent circumstances in Fiji emphasize and dramatize the ‘outward urge’ that has 
become so powerful in the region. By contrast in Tonga there is no real evidence of any 
significant changes in the structure and impact of migration in the past decade. Fiji by 
contrast represents a country where migration and remittances have grown in 
significance, as has the awareness of their importance on the part of the government and 
financial sector. 
A distinctive feature of international migration in the Pacific is that migrants have 
typically tended to be settlers, rather than temporary migrants, even though they may 
express (and sometimes act on) intentions to return home. Permanent migration is 
particularly true of many migrants from Fiji (mainly Indo-Fijians) and especially Tonga. 
This limits direct comparisons with other migration-remittance states, such as the 
Philippines and Pakistan, where most migrants are on short-term contracts. In recent 
years there has been a growing demand for more temporary, contract migrants, 
primarily from Gulf countries, which have been attracting growing number of 
temporary migrants from Fiji, mainly Indigenous-Fijians, and from growing labour-
market pressures for short-term contract labour migration from the Asia-Pacific region 
to Australia and New Zealand for both skilled and unskilled work. It is in this context 
that the potential economic benefits from remittances need to be assessed. 
So substantial has international migration become that as many as a third of all 
households in Fiji had at least one overseas migrant (compared with 60 per cent in 
Tonga), and 43 per cent of households received remittances (compared with 90 per cent 
in Tonga). This is a remarkably high percentage after a relatively short period of 
engagement in international labour migration, and already reflects the substantial 
presence of Indigenous-Fijians in the security industry in the Middle East. Moreover, 
Indo-Fijian households are also remittance recipients contrary to earlier beliefs that few 
received remittances (Stanwix and Connell 1995; Connell and Brown 2005). It has been 
stated that the earnings of 250 Fijian soldiers working in Iraq for a UK security 
company totalled nearly US$3 million in a six-month period in 2004-5 with all that pay 
being sent back to bank accounts in Fiji. Other estimates in 2005 suggested that 
remittances to Fiji would reach about US$200 million for that year, well up from the 
US$30.3 million in 2002, but consistent with our estimate for 2004 of US$130 million 
(Brown et al. 2006). In Fiji therefore—even in the last three years—there has been   3
explosive growth in the extent and significance of both migration and remittances, and 
some of these impacts are assessed in this paper.  
Migration has reduced the level of open and disguised unemployment in the migrant-
sending countries although there is also a growing concern that it has contributed to a 
loss of skilled human resources, through ‘brain-drain’. It is also believed that 
professionals and skilled workers are more likely to migrate following political or other 
social problems as appeared to be the case in Fiji following the military coups in 1987 
and 2000. 
2.2 Income  distribution 
There is conflicting evidence in the literature on the impact of remittances on income 
distribution, with some finding that remittances improve distribution while others find 
that they reinforce existing inequalities. The reason often advanced is that the impact 
evolves over time. In the earlier stages of a country’s migration experience, there is 
often a self-selection bias, with migrants not being randomly distributed across all 
income groups. It is usually argued that in the early stages migrants are more likely to 
come from the more prosperous households who are more able to take on the risks 
associated with migration, and with the ensuing remittances acting to reinforce existing 
income differences. But, as migration networks develop and migration becomes more 
widespread among all income groups, income distribution can be improved by 
migration and remittances, with remittances to lower-income households likely to be 
relatively much larger in relation to income from other sources. The early migration and 
remittances literature on the South Pacific tended to stress the negative impact of 
remittances on income inequality, with most observers noting that migration remittances 
were associated more with relatively well-off households (Shankman 1976; Connell 
1981).  
Tonga 
The first attempt to formally quantify the impact of remittances on income distribution 
in the South Pacific was Ahlburg’s (1991) study of Tonga and Samoa (Western Samoa 
at that time). Following what was then the conventional approach, treating remittances 
as an exogenous addition to household income, he uses 1984 Tongan household level 
income data to compare the share of income (excluding remittances) going to the 
poorest 20 per cent and richest 20 per cent with their respective shares of total 
remittances received. He concludes that the poorest households received 6 per cent of 
non-remittance income but 18 per cent of remittances, and the richest households 
received 43 per cent of non-remittance income but only 29 per cent of remittances, thus 
concluding that remittances improved income distribution.  
The first attempt to compare Gini coefficients with and without remittance income is an 
ILO study of Tongan and Samoan remittances by Brown and Connell (1993). Using 
1992 household survey data they find that remittances improved income distribution in 
both countries. The Gini coefficient in Tonga improved from 0.434 without remittances 
to 0.383 with remittances, and in Samoa from 0.280 to 0.257. In a subsequent paper 
Ahlburg (1996) computes Gini coefficients from earlier 1984 Tongan household income 
and expenditure survey data. He finds that the Gini coefficients improved from 0.37 
without remittances to 0.34 with remittances. If these data can be considered   4
comparable (which is questionable, Ahlburg 1996: 396), they would suggest that while 
remittances improve distribution, over the 8-year time period, 1984-92 income 
distribution in Tonga had worsened.2 This seems to be supported by the most recent 
estimate of the Gini coefficients at 0.42, based on the 2001 Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) (ADB 2004). This suggests that despite the positive impact 
of remittances on income and income distribution, there is still growing inequality in 
Tonga. The Asian Development Bank attributes this to growing youth unemployment, 
combined with increasing migration from the outer  islands to the main island of 
Tongatapu, which is increasing the dependency ratios and numbers of landless and land-
poor on Tongatapu (ADB 2004). 
Fiji 
For Fiji there have been no previous attempts to measure the impact of remittances on 
income distribution. The earliest Gini coefficients for Fiji were computed for 1977 by 
Stavenuiter (1983) and 1990-91 by Ahlburg (1995) and reported in the government of 
Fiji/UNDP Fiji Poverty Report (UNDP 1996). In these studies household income is 
defined in terms of gross income, including cash and non-cash income as well as 
transfers and gifts, before tax. The Gini coefficients reported in Table 1 should therefore 
be interpreted as income including remittances. Using both total and per capita 
household income data, Ahlburg shows that income distribution deteriorated by 5 to 7 
percentage points over this period, and, that this was true for both urban and rural 
households. However, the most recent 2002/3 estimate shows a strong improvement in 
distribution with the Gini coefficient of 0.34. 
Ahlburg (1995) also shows that income distribution is consistently worse for the Indo-
Fijian community. However, Ahlburg finds evidence supporting Stavenuiter’s (1983) 
earlier finding from the 1977 household income and expenditure survey that differences 
within the two main ethnic groups were much greater than the differences between 
them. Also of note was that poor Indo-Fijian households were considerably poorer than 
the poorest Indigenous-Fijians. 
These estimates also indicate that income inequality in Fiji was worse than in Tonga. 
Table 1 
Fiji: Gini coefficients (per capita income), 1977-2002/3 
 1977  1990/1  2002/3 
    
National average  0.43  0.49  0.34 
Indigenous-Fijian NA  0.42  0.31 
Indo-Fijian NA  0.53  0.36 
Sources:  Stavenuiter (1983) for 1977; Ahlburg (1995) for 1990/1; and Abbott (2006) for 2002/3.  
                                                 
2   To our knowledge the only other estimate for Tonga is that of McKenzie et al. (2006), who compute a 
Gini coefficient of 0.338 for weekly earnings from wage, salary and self-employment, excluding 
remittances, which, if comparable with Brown and Connell (1993), indicates a slight improvement in 
income distribution over the period 1992-2006.    5
2.3 Poverty  measures 
There has been only one attempt to measure the incidence of poverty in Tonga. Using 
2001 household income and expenditure data, and a poverty line of T$28.18 per capita 
per week, it was estimated that approximately 23 per cent of the population (i.e., the 
poverty headcount ratio) was in poverty in 2001 (ADB 2004). As income and 
expenditure would presumably include remittances and other transfers, the incidence of 
poverty would be substantially greater without remittances, especially in view of 
Tonga’s very high reliance on migration and remittances, as noted previously. To date, 
there have been no attempts to gauge the impact of remittances on poverty in Tonga, 
making the results reported in this study a first (see section 5). 
The earliest estimates of the incidence of poverty (poverty headcount ratio) for Fiji are 
based on the 1977 HIES. Stavenuiter (1983) estimates that 15 per cent of households 
were below the poverty line.3 Estimates for the early 1990s vary considerably and are 
based on varying methods and data sources, with a range from 12 per cent to 37 per cent 
(see UNDP 1996: Table 12). The most reliable and widely used estimate from the 
1990/1 HIES data is 25.5 per cent, based on a minimum gross household income of 
F$83 per week (see Ahlburg 1995; UNDP 1996). His estimates for various regions and 
ethnic groups are shown in Table 2. The Poverty Task Force in Fiji estimates that the 
incidence of poverty had risen to between 33 and 50 per cent by 2002 (Yari 2003). The 
most recent official estimate is 34.4 per cent incidence (poverty headcount ratio), based 
on the 2002/3 HIES (Abbott 2006). 
The depth of poverty, as measured by the poverty gap, is based on the average gap 
between the poverty line and the income of the poor, (i.e., those below the poverty line). 
As shown in Table 3, the gap grew from F$666 in 1977 (poverty line = F$1,460 per 
household) to F$1,377 in 1991 (poverty line = F$4,316 per household). Although the 
absolute size of gap increased, the relative depth of poverty when expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line fell from 46 per cent to 32 per cent between 1977 and 
1991. However, the most recent estimates for 2002/3 show an increase to 44 per cent 
(Abbott 2006). Combining the measures of incidence and depth (i.e., the poverty 
headcount ratio and poverty gap) gives the poverty gap ratio, which increased from  
6.8 per cent to 8.1 per cent between 1977 and 1991. By 2002/3 it had risen further, to 
11.2 per cent. From these data the cost of closing the poverty gap was estimated to have 
risen from 1.9 per cent of GDP in 1977 to 2.4 per cent of GDP in 1991, and to 5.2 per 
cent of GDP in 2002/3 (UNDP 1996; Abbott 2006). These measures suggest that the 
incidence and depth of poverty in Fiji have worsened considerably over the last three 
decades. While no comparable data exist for Tonga over the same time period, the 
poverty gap ratio for Tonga, based on 2001 data, was estimated at 7.7 per cent (ADB 
2004), suggesting that both the incidence and depth of poverty was much lower than in 
Fiji. 
In view of the different methodologies and definitions of poverty line used, caution 
needs to be exercised in making comparisons between Tonga and Fiji using these data. 
In section 5, the incidence and depth of poverty in Fiji and Tonga based on our 2005 
survey for the World Bank are calculated using a common methodology, which allows 
                                                 
3   Cameron (1983), using the same data but with a different poverty line, produces a lower estimate of 
9 per cent.   6
us to compare the impacts of migrants’ remittances on both income distribution and 
poverty in both countries. Before presenting our findings it is necessary to discuss some 
important methodological issues that arise when making such comparisons using 
household-level survey data.  
Table 2 
Fiji incidence of poverty, 1977 to 2002/3 
  Poverty headcount ratio 
 1977  1990/1  2002/3 
     
National average  15  25.5  34.4 
Indigenous -Fijian  NA  27.7  33.8 
Indo-Fijian NA  31.0  34.9 
Urban average  12  27.6  31.8 
Indigenous -Fijian  NA  NA  29.9 
Indo-Fijian NA  NA  33.9 
Rural average  20  24.3  38.1 
Indigenous -Fijian  NA  NA  37.3 
Indo-Fijian NA  NA  39.2 
Sources:  Stavenuiter (1983) for 1977; Ahlburg (1995) for 1990/1; and Abbott (2006) for 2002/3.  
Table 3 
Fiji depth of poverty, 1977 to 2002/3 
 1977  1990/1  2002/3 
     
Poverty line  F$1,460 F$4,316 F$9,776 
Poverty gap  F$666  F$1,377 F$4,330 
poverty gap/poverty line, %  46  32  44 
Poverty gap ratio, %  6.8  8.1  11.2 
Poverty gap/GDP, %  1.9  2.4  5.2 
Sources:   Stavenuiter (1983) for 1977; Ahlburg (1995) for 1990/1; and Abbott (2006) for 2002/3.   
3  Other country studies and methodologies 
The findings of the literature on the impact of migration and remittances on poverty and 
inequality indicators are rather mixed, with some studies finding positive and others 
negative impacts. Such contradictory findings are partly due to differences between the 
communities investigated, especially in relation to the types of migrant and migration 
histories. An improvement in inequality and poverty indicators can be expected when 
the poor have access to migration opportunities and remittances. This is more likely to 
be the case with ‘mature’ migrant-sending communities with high prevalence migration 
rates such as Tonga, Samoa and Cook Islands in the South Pacific context.4 However, 
                                                 
4   According to the cumulative migration theory, during the early stages of migration only households at 
the upper end of the income distribution can afford the migration costs and absorb its risks. The 
establishment of migrant’s networks in the destination country reduces these migration costs and risks 
by providing financial and in-kind assistance to new migrants, as well as help with job hunting.   7
different methodological approaches to estimating the impact of migration and 
remittances can also lead to different conclusions. As noted previously, the choice of 
methodology depends not only on the characteristics of the data being used, but also on 
the analyst’s underlying assumptions about the relationship between migration and 
remittances on one hand, and poverty and inequality on the other. In the rest of this 
section four basic approaches identified in the current literature are discussed and the 
findings from studies in other countries are compared.  
3.1  Direct effects on household income and inequality5 
The 1980s literature aimed at studying the direct impact6 of remittances upon household 
income and village inequality indicators. Under the simplifying assumption that 
remittances are an exogenous transfer and not a substitute for migrants’ home earnings, 
the focus of the analysis was principally on decomposition techniques and the 
estimation of inequality indicators, using household income including and excluding 
remittances. In other words, these earlier studies did not attempt to estimate the 
opportunity costs of migration; that is, what the migrant members would have 
contributed to household income had they not migrated. Neither were the indirect 
effects of remittances on other sources of income included in the analysis.7  
One of the main contributions of this strand of the literature was to provide evidence of 
the different effects of remittances across communities and/or countries, depending 
largely at what stage they were in the migration process. The general findings were 
supportive of the view that income inequality worsened in the early stages of migration 
where only the relatively well-off households could afford the costs of migration and 
therefore enjoy access to supplementary remittances income. However, as migration 
networks expanded in the migrants’ destination country, migration costs were 
significantly reduced, giving poorer households affordable access to migration 
possibilities. As the share of migrants in a population increases, the initial, negative 
effects of remittances on distribution weaken and could begin to have a positive effect. 
In their seminal work, Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki  (1986) use Gini decomposition 
techniques to measure the impact of remittances on inequality in a sample of 61 
households in two Mexican villages, one of which had a long history of undocumented 
migration to the United States, and the other, not. When comparing village Gini 
coefficients with and without remittances included in household income, the authors 
find that remittances decreased inequality in both villages, though the effect was 
substantially larger for the village with a long migration history. 
                                                                                                                                               
Mature migrant-sending communities have thus lower migration costs and risks, which can be 
afforded by poor households (Massey, Goldring and Durand 1994). 
5   The emphasis of the literature was on inequality indicators and decomposition techniques. The role of 
remittances in poverty alleviation did not receive special attention. 
6   The direct effect is measured by the direct contribution of remittances to total household income. 
7   As discussed by the new economics migration literature (NEML), migration and remittances might 
have indirect effects on incomes of remaining household members via the provision of insurance or 
the removal of liquidity constraints. A negative disincentive effect might also operate due to 
asymmetric information and moral hazard.    8
The authors also analyse the marginal effect of remittances upon income inequality, 
which according to their analytical framework, depends upon three factors: (i) the share 
of remittances in the total village income; (ii) the inequality of remittances distribution 
within the village, and (iii) where the remittance recipients are located in the overall 
village income distribution as indicated by the correlation between remittances and total 
income rankings (Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki 1986: 733). They observe that a 1 per cent 
increase in international remittances leads to a 0.11 per cent improvement in income 
distribution in the village with a long history of international migration, while 
worsening inequality by 0.14 per cent in the other village. A similar result is noted for 
the impact of internal remittances. As these authors acknowledge, these conclusions are 
based on the assumption that household labour and production plans do not change in 
response to the departure of the migrant and the inflow of remittances. However, they 
argue that including such indirect effects of migration upon household income would 
tend to strengthen rather than weaken the observed direct effects. Only in the extreme 
case where total household income declines in response to a marginal increase in 
remittances, would the observed results be altered (ibid.). 
Using a similar decomposition technique, Leones and Feldman (1998) examine the 
impact of remittances upon inequality indicators in a representative sample of 50 
households in a Philippine village with a relatively low propensity to migrate. Though 
only a few households (four) in the sample received international remittances, they 
accounted for 18 per cent of total income. This study finds remittances to be more 
unequally distributed than other sources of income and to play a significant role in 
increasing total income inequality within the village. As measured by the Gini 
coefficient, remittances are responsible for almost half (47 per cent) of income 
inequality in the village (Leones and Feldman 1998: 802). 
This is essentially the same methodology as used by Ahlburg (1991, 1995, 1996), 
Brown and Connell (1993) and others in their estimates of the impact of remittances on 
inequality in the South Pacific as discussed in section 2 of this paper. 
3.2  Indirect effects on household income and inequality 
A distinguishing feature of the new economics of labour migration (NELM) pioneered 
by Stark and Levhari (1982) has been the inclusion of potential indirect effects of 
migration and remittances on other sources of income in the migrant-sending household. 
Taylor (1992) breaks new ground by using a simultaneous equations approach to 
estimate these indirect effects and to incorporate them in the analysis of inequality with 
and without remittances. 
According to the NELM, the migration decision and the subsequent remittance inflows 
affect the household’s exposure to income risks, as well as its investment and 
production decisions. Migrant remittances might provide insurance and relieve the 
household’s budget constraint which in turn might lead the remaining household 
members to adopt riskier or costly production techniques with higher potential returns. 
On the downside, remittances might also increase the reservation wage of remaining 
household members, thus affecting their labour participation and supply decisions. As a 
result, when the indirect effects of insurance, investment and liquidity prevail, the 
marginal impact of remittances on total household income is hypothesized greater than 
unity. In contrast when the disincentive effect prevails, the marginal impact will be less   9
than unity (Taylor 1992). Intertemporal, long-run effects of remittances might also be at 
play if households decide to invest their remittances in productive assets, which then 
provide an additional contribution to household’s total income in subsequent years.  
Two studies of a longitudinal sample of 55 rural households in Mexico carried out by 
Taylor (1992) and Taylor and Wyatt (1996) incorporate these indirect and intertemporal 
effects into the analysis of the impact of remittance on inequality indicators. In a first 
scenario where only the direct effects of remittances are taken into account, Taylor 
(1992) finds remittances to be less equally distributed than farm income. However, 
since recipient households were located at the lower end of the village income 
distribution, the Gini coefficient improved, or at least did not worsen, when remittances 
were included in the calculations for the two time-periods under study. The marginal 
effects of remittances on income distribution were found to be positive, although they 
weakened over time from 0.03 per cent in 1982 and 0.01 per cent in 1988, as migration 
opportunities became accessible to relatively poor households. 
The author also analyses an alternative scenario, where the indirect effects of 
remittances on other sources of income were incorporated (Taylor 1992). First, these 
effects are noted to be negative in the earlier year, 1982, but then to become positive in 
1988. As a result, the indirect effects of remittances reinforced the negative marginal 
impact of remittances in 1988, while partially offset their negative effects in 1982. 
However, once the longer-term investment effects of remittances were included, a 
marginal increase in the amount of remittances in 1982 resulted in an improvement in 
the 1988 Gini coefficient (-0.01 per cent). 
Taylor’s analytical framework is extended in Taylor and Wyatt (1996), who use similar 
techniques to analyze the same dataset for 1988, but relaxing the assumption of constant 
indirect effects (shadow value) of remittances across all households. They argue that 
remittances will have weaker indirect effects on wealthy households who do not face 
liquidity constraints and are able to absorb their production risks, without relying on 
migrants’ remittances. The authors find that the marginal income effects of remittances 
varied widely across the household asset distribution. The larger the value of a 
household’s assets, the larger the positive marginal effects of remittances on income. 
The direct marginal effect of remittances reduced inequality but by very little (-0.07 per 
cent), but once the indirect effects were taken into account, the impact of remittances on 
inequality became stronger (-0.26 per cent), which is explained by the larger shadow 
value (indirect effects) of remittances for households at the middle-to-bottom end of the 
income distribution. 
This strand of the literature therefore extends the Gini decomposition analysis 
introduced by Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986), by using econometric techniques to 
estimate the indirect effects of remittances on earnings of the remaining household 
members, which are then incorporated into the inequality analysis. However, by 
focusing on the impact of remittances on the income of remaining household members, 
this analytical framework still excludes the opportunity costs of migration; that is, what 
the migrants would be contributing to household income had they decided to stay.8  
                                                 
8   See, for example, Taylor, Rozelle and de Brauw (2003: 91).   10
As a consequence, the more recent focus of the migration and remittances literature has 
been on the development of a methodology to estimate a counterfactual income for 
households with migrants and remittances. This would allow the analyst to estimate 
what the household’s level of welfare would have been, as measured by income or 
consumption, in the absence of migration. This counterfactual welfare level is then used 
to estimate what the poverty and inequality indicators would have been in a hypothetical 
scenario of no-migration, which are then compared with actual income including 
remittances. Studies following this approach are discussed later in this section (3.4) of 
the paper.  
3.3  Net effects on poverty and inequality indicators 
after controlling for endogeneity  
It is also worth noting that a different strand of the recent literature has addressed the 
impact of migration and remittances on inequality and poverty indicators at the 
community level. The focus here is on measuring the net effects of migration on 
community-level indicators of poverty and inequality. Taking advantage of large 
datasets, which allow analysis at the community rather than household level, recent 
studies have estimated national or community indicators of poverty and inequality as a 
function of migration prevalence rates. Instrumental variable techniques are then used to 
control for potential endogeneity bias9 that might arise due to several factors such as 
self-selection of migrants, reverse causation or omitted variables.10  
Adams and Page (2005) study the impact of international migration and remittances on 
poverty indicators in 71 low-income and middle-income developing countries. After 
controlling for endogeneity, the study finds both variables to have a strong impact on 
poverty reduction. A 10 per cent increase in the proportion of international migrants in a 
country’s population leads to a 2.1 per cent fall in the number of people living on less 
than US$ 1 a day. 
Similar conclusions are also drawn by Lopez-Cordoba (2004). He analyses the impact 
of remittances on poverty indicators, using a cross-section of 2,443 Mexican 
municipalities. He notes that after controlling for endogeneity, a 1 per cent increase in 
the proportion of remittance-receiving households in a community is associated with a 
4.5 per cent decline in the proportion of the population earning less than the minimum 
wage. 
                                                 
9   Under endogeneity, the OLS coefficients will be biased. They will reflect both the net impact of the 
explanatory variable as well as the endogeneity bias. Formally: 
 
11






ββ =+ . 
10  Several examples can illustrate the potential endogeneity bias in migration and remittances studies, as 
follows: (i) Self-selection: Should migrants be positively (negatively) selected in regard to education, 
they will tend to come from the upper (lower) end of the income distribution. (ii) Reverse causation: 
The relationship between poverty and remittances might be bi-directional. The poorer a community is, 
the more incentives people would have to migrate and remit. On the other hand, remittances received 
by poor household will have a negative effect on poverty indicators. (iii) Omitted variable: 
Community levels of social capital might not be observable. However, they might have an impact on 
both the dependent variable (poverty indicators) and the independent variable (migration levels).    11
In relation to inequality, McKenzie (2006) studies Mexican data, using a sample of 214 
municipalities with a population less than 100,000. As suggested by the migration 
literature, he notes that during the early stages of migration, inequality in a community 
increases, but this effect is reversed as migration opportunities become available to a 
wider section of the population. The impact of migration is rather large with a 
one-standard deviation increase in migration prevalence being associated with a 0.5 
standard deviation improvement in the Gini coefficient.  
Yang and Martinez (2006) examine the effects of remittances upon poverty and 
inequality indicators in the Philippines. The authors use a set of linked household 
surveys and a sample of 26,121 households. They ‘exploit a unique natural experiment’, 
the major exchange rate shocks during the Asian crises, that provides them with an 
instrument that isolates the net impact of remittance flows on the outcome variables. 
This study finds that a 3 per cent improvement in the region-level migrant exchange rate 
(their instrument for remittances) leads to a 1.8 percentage point decline in the regional 
poverty rate. However the effect on the poverty gap and inequality indicators was not 
statistically significant. 
What these studies have in common, therefore, is their focus on the specific 
econometric question of estimating the net effects of migration on regional inequality 
and poverty indicators. In their analyses they use a cross-section of countries (Adams 
and Page 2005), regions (Yang and Martinez 2006) or local communities 
(Lopez-Cordoba 2004; McKenzie 2006). In contrast, when the object of the analysis is 
to examine the impact of migration on poverty and inequality indicators in a single 
community, or, as in our case, small island economies, the econometric question to be 
addressed is what the poverty and inequality indicators would be in a counterfactual 
scenario of no-migration. 
3.4  Building a counterfactual ‘no-migration’ scenario  
The studies reviewed in this subsection use a cross-section of households within a 
country (Adams 1989 and 2006; Rodriguez 1998) or a local community (Barham and 
Boucher 1998). In this approach the focus is on determining whether poverty and 
inequality levels are lower in the actual scenario, with migration and remittances, than 
in a hypothetical counterfactual scenario without migration and remittances. The core of 
the methodology consists of estimating what the migrant household’s income would be 
if migrant members had decided to stay, that is, a ‘counterfactual household income’. 
The estimated counterfactual household income needs to remove both the direct11 and 
indirect12 effects of migration on the earnings of remaining household members, while 
imputing the home earnings of migrants had they not migrated. However, it should be 
noted that this methodology implicitly assumes that the labour market conditions are 
unaffected by the outflow of migrants and subsequent inflow of remittances. In other 
words, the labour market conditions that prevail in the with-migration scenario are 
assumed to be the same for the counterfactual without-migration scenario. 
                                                 
11    The direct effects of migration on household income as measured by the amount of remittances 
received. 
12  As previously discussed, indirect or spillover effects might arise due to insurance provision, loosening 
of liquidity constraints and increasing the reservation wage of remaining household members.   12
The ‘counterfactual approach’ was initially developed by Adams (1989) in his study of 
the effects of remittances on poverty and inequality in a sample of 1,000 households 
across three villages in Egypt. In order to estimate the counterfactual household income, 
he estimates a mean regression of incomes of non-migrant households and uses the 
resulting parameters to predict the incomes of migrant households. These predicted 
incomes of migrant households were then used to estimate poverty and inequality in a 
counterfactual scenario of no-migration. While inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient is noted to worsen from 0.23 to 0.29 when remittances were included, the 
poverty headcount ratio decreased from 26.8 per cent to 24.4 per cent.  
A similar methodology is used by Rodriguez (1998) to study the impact of migration13 
on inequality, using a sample of 24,782 households in the Philippines. When 
remittances are treated as an exogenous transfer to the household, inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, deteriorated by 1.3 per cent. When a counterfactual 
methodology is used and remittances treated as a substitute for migrants’ home 
earnings, the negative impact of migration on income distribution is significantly 
stronger with the Gini coefficient increasing by 7.9 per cent.  
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that estimated counterfactual income in both of 
these studies might lead to biased estimates due to potential self-selection bias. If 
observed household migrants are not a random draw of the population, using the 
regression parameters of non-migrant households will bias the counterfactual income 
estimates. 
Barham and Boucher’s (1998) study on Nicaragua and Adams’ (2006) analysis of 
Guatemala test for self-selection of migrant households and in both instances conclude 
that migrant households do not appear to be self-selected. Any bias resulting from the 
ordinary least squares estimates without selection controls would therefore be small. 
They then estimate counterfactual incomes to compare poverty and inequality indicators 
with and without migration. Barham and Boucher conclude that when remittances are 
treated as an exogenous transfer, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient declines 
by 9 per cent. However when remittances are treated as a substitute for individual 
migrant’s income and their indirect effects are taken into account, inequality increases. 
Adams finds that when both internal and international remittances are included, the 
poverty headcount ratio decreases by 2.01 per cent, while the poverty gap declines by 
3.64 per cent. Their impact on the Gini coefficient is also negative, though small (-0.20 
per cent). 
It is therefore clear that the conclusions drawn from studies of the impact of migration 
and remittances on income inequality and poverty are varied, and, very often their 
conflicting findings are a function of the assumptions and methodology followed when 
estimating the counterfactual, without-remittances income of the migrant-sending 
household. What is of particular importance is that when migrants’ remittances are not 
treated as an exogenous addition to income, and their forgone earnings are imputed into 
household income in the non-migration scenario, results and conclusions can be 
reversed. 
                                                 
13  The author also uses the Gini decomposition analysis as described in subsection 3.1. The results are 
similar to those obtained with the counterfactual methodology.    13
3.5  The methodology of this study 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of migration on inequality and 
poverty levels in Fiji and Tonga using our 2005 dataset compiled for the World Bank 
study (Brown et al. 2006). Taking into account the characteristics of the dataset, this 
study follows a basic counterfactual approach as discussed in the previous subsection. 
This approach assumes migrants to be a non-random group of the population and sets 
the stochastic term to zero.14  
Before discussing in detail the econometric model, several issues deserve some 
consideration. First, migration decisions as well as other decisions regarding the 
allocation of household labour to economic activities are assumed to be made at the 
household level.15 Thus, following the NELM, the unit of analysis is the household, 
rather than individual household members. Second, as discussed later, in both countries 
households without migrants also receive remittances (see Table 5). It is assumed here 
that remittances received by non-migrant households16 are exogenous additions to 
household income. The reason for imputing the forgone earnings of migrants is that they 
represent the opportunity cost of migration to the household to which the migrant 
belonged. It seems reasonable then to assume that households that receive remittances 
but do not send any migrants abroad have not had to forgo any income, and so, for 
them, remittances are an exogenous transfer. (In the no-migration scenario, household 
income for both migrant and non-migrant households excludes all remittances, 
irrespective of whether they are sent by household members or others.) Third, in order 
to improve the appropriateness of the counterfactual imputations, the natural log of 
household income, rather than total income, is used as the dependent variable in the 
regression analysis. 
In order to construct what household income would be in the no-migration scenario, this 
study aims at estimating a mean regression of natural log incomes of non-migrant 
households. Under the assumption of no self-selection, the resulting parameters are used 
to predict the expected natural log income of migrant households. The predicted values 
of the natural log of income for migrant households thus estimated are then used to 
calculate per capita household income adjusted by adult equivalent scales. It is assumed 
that a child under 14 is equivalent to 0.5 adults.17 Following Deaton (1997: ch. 3), 
poverty and inequality indicators are calculated using household data weighted by 
household size. 
                                                 
14    It should be noted that when the predicted income of migrant households is based only on the 
estimated parameter coefficients, with the stochastic term set to zero, it is possible that variance in 
household income is artificially reduced  which could influence the results (Adams 1989; Barham and 
Boucher 1998; Rodriguez 1998). The use of a counterfactual methodology testing for self-selection 
and using stochastic imputation is work in progress as part of Eliana Jimenez’s ongoing PhD thesis. 
15  Note that the definitions used in the survey for household ‘those who cook and eat from the same pot’, 
as well as for migrant household members ‘those who lived with the household before migrating or 
would live with the household if they were to return’, include both nuclear and extended family. 
16    According to the definition of migrant household members, non-migrant households receive 
remittances from friends and relatives who neither lived with the household before migrating nor 
would live with them if returning. 
17   Narsey  (2006) uses this adult-equivalent scale in his study of urban poverty in Fiji, following a 
common practice in international studies   14
4 The  data 
4.1 The  survey 
The survey was prepared and conducted in the first half of 2005. (For details of the 
design of the survey instrument, selection of enumeration areas, sampling and survey 
administration, see Appendix C of Brown et al. 2006.) The overall sample of 918 
households was made up of 418 households in Fiji and 500 in Tonga and as previously 
discussed, information was collected for the household and for each individual within 
the household, giving a total of 4,663 sampled individuals, 1,937 in Fiji and 2,726 in 
Tonga.  
4.2  The Fiji sample 
Fiji, with a population of 836,000, comprises 322 islands, with approximately 110 of 
them inhabited, though the largest two islands, Viti-Levu and Vanua Levu, are home to 
over 94 per cent of the people. The main population centres, including the capital, Suva, 
are located in the main island, Viti-Levu, which accounts for over 70 per cent of the 
residents. However, due to budget constraints, the survey sample was drawn from Viti-
Levu only, excluding Vanua Levu and the outer islands.  
The survey sample consisted of urban and rural enumeration areas, scattered across 
Viti-Levu. They cover the capital city, Suva; the five major towns in both provinces 
(Nausori, Lautoka, Nadi, Ba and Sigatoka); nine villages and twelve settlements. In total 
420 households were interviewed, with only two refusing to answer the questionnaire, 
which left 418 households in our sample.  
4.3  The Tongan sample 
The Kingdom of Tonga embraces 171 islands, of which around 40 are populated. Out of 
the 100,000 Tongan residents, only 25 per cent live in the outer islands, with the large 
majority of the population living in the main island of Tongatapu and mostly 
concentrated in the capital, Nuku’alofa. The capital city is home to around 50 per cent 
of the people. 
This population split is reflected in the survey sample, which was selected directly by 
the Department of Statistics in Nuku’alofa. The primary sampling units consist of 20 
enumeration areas covering both the urban and rural population. In total, the Tongan 
sample consists of 500 households drawn from the capital city Nuku’alofa, four districts 
of rural Tongatapu and the remaining 125 households chosen from two groups of outer 
islands, Vava’u and Hapa’i. 
4.4 Sample  characteristics 
As can be seen in Table 4, the survey sample reflects the almost even urban-rural split 
of the population in Tonga and the main island of Fiji, Viti Levu, as well as the ethnic 
distribution in the latter, with 50.5 per cent of the Fiji sample being Indo-Fijian, 47.1 per 
cent Indigenous-Fijian (abbreviated to Indig-Fijian in Table 4) and the remaining 2.4 
per cent constituting other ethnic groups.   15
Table 5 shows which households had received remittances in one form or another over 
the preceding year.18 The sample is split between those households with at least one 
migrant and those without any migrant members. As expected, most households with a 
migrant member received remittances: 86.8 per cent in Fiji and 97.6 per cent in Tonga. 
Although the high incidence of remitting migrants was to be expected from previous 
knowledge about remittances and migration networks in the region, what was not 
expected was the high proportion of households without any migrants who were also in 
receipt of remittances. 
In Tonga, where migration- and remittances-dependency have been long established and 
have become almost ubiquitous, nearly 80 per cent of non-migrant households had 
received remittances in 2004. In Fiji, the less ‘mature’ migration-and-remittances 
economy, almost 20 per cent of households without migrants had received remittances. 
Of the total sample, 90.9 per cent of Tongan and 42.0 per cent of Fiji households 
received remittances.19 
Within the two main ethnic groups in Fiji a similar proportion of migrant households 
received remittances: 84.7 per cent among Indo-Fijians and 89.1 per cent among 
Indigenous-Fijians. However, a somewhat larger proportion of Indo-Fijian households 
without a migrant received remittances (26.8 per cent), in comparison with Indigenous-
Fijian households (14.7 per cent).  
These observations are important for they suggest that as migration and remittances 
become more commonplace in an economy, non-migrant households can benefit more 
from direct access to remittances. This points to a more nuanced view on the 
relationship between migration, remittances and household living standards and 
inequality in these societies than what is generally argued in most other studies of 
migration and remittances where it is normally assumed that it is only the immediate 
family members of the migrant who stand to benefit, at least directly, from the flows of 
remittances.  
Finally, in Table 6, summary statistics show the extent of mean income differences 
between households with and without migrants.20 
In both countries, both household income and income per capita are higher for 
households with migrants. However, it is also noticeable that for Tongan households the 
variability of income is considerably higher for migrant households, whereas for Fiji 
households this is the case for non-migrant households. 
                                                 
18   In this study remittances are defined broadly to include cash transferred both formally through the 
financial system and informally, hand-carried, as well as remittances in kind (e.g., goods sent or 
carried by the migrant), as well as payments such as airfares, made by the migrant on behalf of the 
recipient household.  
19  The percentage for Tonga is considerably higher than the 75 per cent found in the 2001 HIES. The 
most likely explanation for the difference is that  the HIES used a rather general question about cash 
remittances only, while this questionnaire  asks numerous questions with cross-checks to assist  the 
respondent in recalling transfers that might not have been considered remittances, such as in-kind 
transfers, and  bills paid on behalf of the household. The 91 per cent figure is also very similar to what 
was observed in a similar survey over a decade earlier (Brown 1995). 
20  Income includes estimates of subsistence income derived from the survey data.   16
Table 4 
Composition of 2005 household sample, Fiji and Tonga 
Country Urban  Rural  Total 
 
Fiji n  =  208  210  418 
 %  49.76  50.24  100.00 
Tonga n  =  250  250  500 
 %  50.00  50.00  100  .00 
Total n  =  458  460  918 
 %  49.89  50.11  100.00 
  Fiji by ethnic group 
Indo-Fijian n=  107  90  197 
 %  54.31  45.69  100.00 
Indig-Fijian n=  94  117  211 
 %  44.55  55.45  100.00 
Source:   Brown et al. (2006). 
Table 5 
Households receiving remittances, Fiji and Tonga, 2004 
Fiji   Tonga 
Received remittances?    Received remittances? 
 
 
Migrants in HH? 
No Yes  Total    No Yes  Total 
          
No  220  54 274    45 164 209 
(%)  80.29 19.71 65.55    21.53 78.47 41.80 
Yes  19 125 144    7 284 291 
(%)  13.19 86.81 34.45    2.41 97.59 58.20 
Total  239 179 418    52 448 500 
(%)  57.18  42.82 100   10.40  89.60 100 
Source:   Brown et al. (2006). 
Table 6 
Summary statistics for household income, with and without migrants 
 Fiji    Tonga 
  Mean Std  dev.    Mean Std  dev. 
  Households with migrants 
         
HH income  7,248.65  6,565.97 6,643.31  12,839.66 
Income/capita 1,869.75  1,793.38 1,757.96  4,869.00 
Income/capita adult equiv  2,040.29 1,967.53  1,910.28 4,926.78 
  Households without migrants 
       
HH income  6,364.67  9,506.45 4,718.59  4,512.47 
Income/capita 1,580.89  2,289.70 946.63  789.97 
Income/capita adult equiv  1,732.042 2,370.044  1,138.95  972.61 
Source:   Brown et al. (2006). 
4 Results 
Table 7 shows the definitions and summary statistics of the variables used to estimate 
the natural log of income regressions.    17
Table 7 
Definitions and descriptive statistics for variables in regressions 
 Fiji    Tonga 
Variable description  Mean Std dev.   Mean Std dev.
          
Dummy non-migrant household  0.65    0.42
Household size including migrants  5.37  2.48   6.85 3.27
Ratio of HH Members under 14 and over 60, incl. migrants  0.24  0.22   0.32 0.23
Dummy HH with female head  0.18    0.22
HH head age  46.46  13.12   51.89 14.90
HH head age square  2330.1  1327.15   2914.51 1607.96
Dummy HH lives in urban area  0.495    0.50
Dummy Indo-Fijian household  0.47    na
Dummy for outer island HH  na    0.25
Average years of education of adult HHM, incl. migrants*  10.25  2.85   0.48
Dummy for female-headed HH with a tertiary educated member  na    0.07
Interaction dummy Indo-Fijian and average yrs of education 
of adults  4.85 5.55
 
Dummy HH owns agricultural land in 2003  0.22  0.41   0.51 0.50
Note:  * For Tonga this is dummy variable for presence of HH member with tertiary education. 
5.1  Poverty and inequality indicators in the actual and counterfactual scenarios  
Following the imputation methodology discussed in section 3, the results of the natural 
log of income regressions for the subsample of non-migrant households were used to 
estimate income for migrant households.21 This imputed income, which sets remittances 
to zero, is then used to calculate per capita household income adjusted by adult-
equivalent scales. This estimation incorporates all household members including 
migrants and non-migrants and assumes that one child under 14 is equivalent to 0.5 of 
an adult.22  
For comparability purposes, the Gini coefficient is used as a measure of inequality, 
while the poverty analysis uses the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap 
indicators discussed in section 2. Due to unavailability of official data to estimate per 
capita poverty lines and the questionnaire design, this study uses a subjective poverty 
line, constructed from the survey data.23 The questionnaire included a minimum cash 
income question, which asked respondents how much money a family like theirs 
                                                 
21    These regressions assume that remittances received by non-migrant households have no indirect 
effects in their income. See Appendix for detailed results. 
22  Similar results were also obtained when poverty and inequality indicators were calculated using per 
capita household income, without adjusting for adult-equivalent scales.  
23  The survey collected information about annual income and not household consumption. In order to 
minimize the recollection bias, households were first asked about the minimum income required to get 
by. This was followed by another question regarding whether they thought the survey year was good 
or bad in terms of income; that is, whether their income was sufficient to get by, taking into account 
their previous answer. After this, the question about actual sources of income during the preceding 
year (2004) was put to the respondents. Importantly, responses to their actual income questions were 
in reference to their subjective ‘required income’ responses.    18
required ‘just to get by’. Household subsistence income, also derived from the survey, 
was added to this amount to estimate the total income that each household considered 
the minimum to get by. Once the total required income had been estimated for each 
household, this amount was divided by the adult-equivalent number of household 
members, where each child was counted as equivalent to 0.5 adults. Following the 
procedure used commonly in the poverty literature, the poverty line was then estimated 
as the median of the required per capita adult-equivalent income in the sample. A 
poverty line of US$765 in Fiji and US$879 in Tonga were thus derived.24 
Table 8 presents the results for the analysis of poverty and inequality indicators, which 
were estimated using the household-level data weighted by household size. The table 
shows the estimated poverty and inequality indicators under each scenario, as well as 
their percentage change when compared against the indicators obtained using actual 
household income, including remittances. To calculate the Gini coefficient, a bootstrap 
procedure was used to derive confidence intervals for the Gini coefficients (95 per cent 
confidence intervals) across the different scenarios. These bias-corrected confidence 
intervals are reported in the rows below the Gini coefficients in Table 8.  
Three basic scenarios are reported. In the first scenario—observed income without 
remittance—the indicators are estimated using observed income (inclusive of 
subsistence income) excluding remittances for all households, with and without 
migrants. This scenario treats remittances as an exogenous addition to income from 
other sources, and only domestically-resident household members are included in the 
calculation of per capita income, as in all previous studies of remittances and income 
inequality in the South Pacific as discussed in section 2. 
Table 8 
Poverty and income inequality indicators with and without remittances 
  Without migration counterfactual    With migration actual 
  Method 1  Method 2   








  Poverty headcount ratio, % 
        
Fiji (a 38.4  42.9  34.1 
Tonga (a 54.7  62.1  32.4 
  Poverty gap ratio, % 
        
Fiji 18.2  17.3  15.1 
Tonga 27.5  27.1  11.6 
 Gini  coefficient 
        
Fiji 0.51  0.47    0.50 
Bias corrected (b 0.47-0.54  0.43-0.52   0.47-0.54 
Tonga 0.53  0.42    0.46 
Bias corrected (b 0.47-0.59  0.39-0.47   0.42-0.51 
Notes:  (a  Estimated poverty line for Fiji = US$765 and US$879 in Tonga per adult per annum; 
  (b  At 95 per cent confidence interval. 
                                                 
24  These convert to approximately F$1,362 and T$1,749 respectively at the nominal exchange rate.   19
The second scenario—counterfactual income—assumes remittances are a substitute for 
migrants’ home earnings and uses the basic counterfactual methodology previously 
discussed to estimate what the poverty and inequality indicators would be without 
migration. Indicators are calculated using observed income for non-migrant households 
(excluding remittances from non-household members), and the counterfactual income 
for migrant households, excluding all remittances. Both domestically-resident and 
migrant household members are included in calculating per capita income.25 
Finally, the third scenario—observed income with remittances—presents the actual 
scenario  with migration, under which the poverty and inequality indicators are 
calculated using observed income including remittances received by all households. 
Only domestically-resident household members are included in the calculation of per 
capita income.26 
Comparing these with the previous estimates of poverty and income distribution in the 
South Pacific as discussed in section 2 shows some interesting similarities and 
differences. For Fiji the poverty headcount ratio including remittances of 34.1 per cent 
is remarkably close to Abbott’s (2006) estimate of 34.4 per cent based on 2002/3 HIES 
data, despite the different methodology for deriving a poverty line. On the other hand, 
our estimate for Tonga of 32.4 per cent is considerably higher than the only previous 
estimate of 23 per cent for 2001 (ADB 2004). Nevertheless, our results are consistent 
with the previous studies in showing that the incidence of poverty is worse in Fiji than 
in Tonga, albeit only slightly.  
For income distribution we find that our estimated Gini coefficient for Tonga (0.46) is 
quite close to the 2001 estimate of 0.42 by ADB (2004). For Fiji, however, our 
estimated Gini coefficient of 0.50 is considerably higher than the most recent 2002/3 
estimate of 0.34 (Abbott 2006). Thus, contrary to the previous estimates for these two 
countries, our results indicate that income distribution is also worse in Fiji than in 
Tonga.  
As Tonga is much more dependent on migration and remittances, these findings provide 
indirect support for the hypothesis that migration and remittances have a positive impact 
on income distribution and poverty. We test this more directly by comparing the various 
ratios with and without migration and remittances.  
As can be seen in Table 8, the poverty headcount and the poverty gap ratios in both 
countries are substantially lower in the observed with migration and remittances 
scenario than in either of the counterfactual without scenarios. These results provide 
strong evidence that migration and the subsequent inflow of remittances alleviate 
poverty in Fiji and Tonga. When remittances are treated as an exogenous addition to 
income, the poverty headcount ratio decreases by 11 per cent in Fiji and 41 per cent in 
                                                 
25   For this reason it is conceivable that per capita income with imputed migrants’ earnings (second 
scenario) is less than per capita income without imputed migrants’ earnings (first scenario) as the 
denominator is larger when migrants are added to domestically-resident household members. 
26 Excluding migrants’ income from the estimates of per capita household income is tantamount to 
assuming that the income and consumption of the migrant members are not relevant from a household 
welfare perspective, or that the migrant is at least no worse-off than other household members. While 
this assumption is questionable, in the absence of information on migrants’ earnings and consumption 
abroad no alternative is possible.    20
Tonga. That is, the percentage of poor households declines from 38 per cent to 34 per 
cent in Fiji, and from 45 per cent to 32 per cent in Tonga. The poverty gap ratio also 
declines in both countries. In Fiji this ratio is reduced by 17 per cent, and by 58 per cent 
in Tonga. These results confirm that the choice of methodology for computing the 
without migration and remittances scenario has a significant impact on the results and 
conclusions drawn. 
The results also show that the poverty alleviation impact of remittances is substantially 
underestimated when the methodology, simplistically, treats remittances as an 
exogenous addition to income. The estimated improvement in the poverty indicators 
with remittances is substantially larger when we use the more complex methodology in 
which remittances are assumed to be endogenous in the hypothetical, no-migration 
scenario. Using this methodology, the incidence of poor households declines from 43 
per cent to 34 per cent in Fiji and from 62 per cent to 32 per cent in Tonga. In other 
words, the poverty headcount ratio improves by 21 per cent in Fiji and by 47 per cent in 
Tonga. Similarly, the poverty gap ratio is reduced by 13 per cent in Fiji and by 57 per 
cent in Tonga. This finding might be explained by different factors. 
First, as discussed in section 3, migration of household members might have an indirect 
positive impact on the income of the remaining household members, via insurance or 
liquidity-constraint effects, which are not captured when remittances are treated as 
exogenous additions to household income. Second, in settings with labour surplus, such 
as appears to be the case in Fiji and Tonga, the marginal contribution of the migrant’s 
home earnings to per capita household income might be negative. In other words, if the 
migrant’s marginal contribution to household income was less than the household’s per 
capita income, leaving the household raises the per capita income of those remaining. 
By the same reasoning, when under the no-migration hypothetical scenario the number 
of resident household members increases, per capita household income will fall if the 
migrant’s imputed earnings are lower than the mean of all other household members. 
On the other hand, the extent to which migration and remittances alleviate poverty 
appears to depend also on the country’s migration history. Comparing the changes in 
poverty indicators in a country with a longer tradition of out-migration, such as Tonga, 
indicates an important difference. Both methodologies show a higher incidence of 
poverty in Tonga (55 per cent and 62 per cent) than in Fiji (38 per cent and 43 per cent) 
before taking account of the effects of migration and remittances. Once the effects of 
migration and remittances are included, the poverty alleviating impact is substantially 
greater, with the end result that the incidence of poverty is lower in Tonga (32.4 per 
cent) than in Fiji (34.1 per cent). Similarly results are shown for the poverty gap ratio 
measuring the depth of poverty. Without migration and remittances the depth of poverty 
is higher in Tonga than in Fiji, but once their impacts are included the poverty gap ratio 
falls in both countries, but by so much more in Tonga that the end result is that the 
poverty gap ratio (11.6 per cent) for Tonga is significantly lower than Fiji’s (15.1 per 
cent). 
Regarding the impact of migration and remittances on measures of inequality, the 
findings are rather ambiguous. In Fiji, when remittances are treated as exogenous 
additions to income, there is only a slight improvement in the Gini coefficient; it falls 
from 0.51 to 0.50, representing a 2.15 per cent improvement. Moreover, this apparent 
improvement is not unambiguous as there is a substantial overlap in the confidence 
intervals (0.47-0.54 versus 0.46-0.54). When the Gini coefficient is estimated using the   21
counterfactual income approach again an ambiguous change is observed but in this 
instance there is an increase in inequality. The Gini coefficient increases from 0.47 to 
0.50, representing a 10 per cent increase in inequality, but as there is a substantial 
overlap in the confidence intervals (0.43-0.52 versus 0.47-0.52) this result is not 
unambiguous. 
In Tonga, on the other hand, when remittances are treated as exogenous additions to 
income, a substantial decline in inequality is observed. The Gini coefficient is reduced 
from 0.53 to 0.46, implying an improvement of 13 per cent. However, when the 
hypothetical counterfactual estimation method is used, the confidence intervals of the 
two Gini coefficients overlap, indicating that migration and remittances do not cause an 
unambiguous improvement in income distribution. In neither case therefore does it 
appear that migration and remittances have an unambiguous positive effect on income 
distribution.  
These apparently contradictory findings, where migration appears to reduce poverty 
substantially, but has little or no impact on inequality could be explained by the findings 
from other analysis of these data on migrants’ motivations to remit.27 Remittances were 
found to be motivated by altruism implying that the poorer the household is, the higher 
the level of remittances it receives. This would explain the important poverty alleviation 
role of remittances found in this study. On the other hand, it is also noted that 
remittances to the wealthier households were motivated by ‘exchange’ (or ‘self-
interest’), implying that the wealthier the household, the higher the amount of 
remittances it received. If the propensity to remit to high-income households is equally 
as strong as it is for poorer households, then it is to be expected that remittances, while 
alleviating poverty at the lower end of the income spectrum, will tend also to reinforce 
existing income inequalities. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper addresses the question of how migration and remittances impact on poverty 
and income distribution in two small Pacific island economies, Fiji and Tonga. We use 
household-level survey data from both countries to estimate a without migration and 
remittances counterfactual household income scenario, against which to compare actual, 
with migration and remittances income.  
Our results are interesting in a number of respects. First, they show that the choice of 
methodology can have a significant impact on the estimated impacts and conclusions 
made about the impacts of migration and remittances on income distribution and 
poverty. We compare the estimated impacts using the counterfactual approach discussed 
above, with the more simplistic and more commonly used method which treats 
remittances as an exogenous addition to other sources of household income. We find 
that in both countries, the impact on poverty measures is considerably greater when the 
methodologically superior counterfactual estimation method is used. 
                                                 
27 This work is in progress as part of Eliana Jimenez’s ongoing PhD thesis. Results available on request.   22
Second, in relation to income distribution we find that after using the counterfactual 
methodology, the impact on distribution is much weaker than previously estimated, and 
the results are rather ambiguous. Nevertheless we find that the Gini coefficients with 
remittances included leave Tonga with a more egalitarian distribution than Fiji. This is 
most probably attributable to the much longer time period over which Fiji has 
experienced the positive distributional impacts of migration and remittances. 
Third, we find that the impact of migration and remittances on poverty alleviation is so 
much stronger in Tonga than in Fiji that although Tonga has a higher incidence and 
depth of poverty than Fiji in the counterfactual without migration and remittances 
scenario, Tonga, with migration and remittances, enjoys a considerably lower incidence 
and depth of poverty than Fiji. We attribute this to Tonga’s longer history and more 
widespread incidence of remittance-receiving households. 
There is, therefore, both indirect and direct evidence that migration and remittances 
have a strong, positive effect on the alleviation of poverty and distribution of income in 
both countries.   23
Appendix 1: Regression results 
Table A1  
Regression results for non-migrant household income, Fiji 
(Dependent variable = natural log of income) 
  
Number of obs 
F(11,   256) 










 Coef.  Std  error 
    
Root MSE  0.0409929  0.0285385 
Counterfactual HH dependency ratio  -0.2211533  0.2652518 
HH head female  -0.445521  0.1609124 
HH head age  0.0520047  0.026784 
HH head age square  -0.0004042  0.0002666 
Dummy HH urban  0.3153537  0.1181928 
Dummy HH indofijian  0.2791577  0.4097433 
Counterfactual average adult educ  0.1335703  0.0289334 
Interaction D_indofjian education  0.0196563  0.0397373 
HH own agricultural land 2003  0.0061896  0.1430405 
Constant 5.044976  0.7152511 
 
Table A2  
Regression results for non-migrant household income, Tonga 
(Dependent variable = natural log of income) 
  
Number of obs 
F(11,   256) 










 Coef.  Std  error 
    
Counterfactual HH size  0.148921  0.044688 
Counterfactual dependency ratio  0.064611  0.474979 
HH head female  -0.834088  0.366299 
HH head age  0.092691  0.058375 
HH head age square  -0.000986  0.000552 
Dummy urban  0.531283  0.295357 
Dummy outer island  0.15702  0.444684 
Counterfactual # HH with tertiary education  0.213771  0.184998 
Interaction female dummy_education  1.030943  0.541518 
Own agricultural land 2003  0.080675  0.288169 
Interaction outer island own land  0.2906  0.509959 
Constant 4.783033  1.464936   24
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